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PREFACE 
Cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) are installed in aircraft to provide information to 
investigators after an accident. They provide records of the flight crew activities and 
conversations, as well as a variety of other auditory information. Information from 
CVRs has proved very useful in determining the events leading up to aircraft 
accidents for many years. However, there has been little discussion in the safety 
investigation field about appropriate ways to analyse recorded voice 
communications, particularly in terms of analysing the quality of the interaction 
between crew members. 
Following the investigation into a controlled flight into terrain accident in an Israel 
Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124 jet aircraft, which impacted terrain near Alice 
Springs on 27 April 1995, the then Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) 
evaluated available methods to analyse recorded voice communications.  
As a result of this research, the ATSB contracted independent experts in an 
emerging field known as ‘conversation analysis’ to analyse the CVR from the 
Westwind 1124 accident. The project was conducted by Dr Maurice Nevile and Dr 
A.J. Liddicoat, both then of the Australian National University. The independent 
consultants’ report provided conclusions regarding the crew interaction which were 
consistent with the original BASI investigation report. More importantly, the 
project showed that the conversation analysis method provided a very useful 
approach to identify, describe, demonstrate and explain difficulties in conversation 
between two or more individuals.  
The present research paper explains the nature of conversation analysis, and its 
potential for use in safety investigation, as well as its potential for demonstrating 
the importance of appropriate crew communication practices. To help explain the 
usefulness of the method, information from the original consultancy project’s 
examination of the Westwind 1124 CVR is included. The present research study is 
not an investigation into the circumstances of the accident.  
It is important to note that a cockpit voice recording provides limited information 
about activity in a cockpit, and cannot provide a complete understanding of all 
activities and interactions among flight crew. It does, however, provide a good 
understanding of what happened and why. The analysis can be enhanced by 
comparing average sound recordings from normal multi-crew communication and 
activity on a flight with a recording from a particular flight that is being studied. 
This comparison can provide more detailed insights into crew activities and 
interactions on a particular operation despite the lack of visual information, for 
example from a cockpit video recording.  
It is acknowledged that a perfect understanding of cockpit activity is hard to achieve 
without the opportunity to interview the flight crew as a part of an investigation. 
However, the methodology described in this paper is intended to expand the level of 
understanding that can be obtained from a cockpit voice recording as a part of an 
investigation.  
The information in this paper is published by the Director of Air Safety 
Investigation under subsection 19HA(2) of the Air Navigation Act 1920 in the 
interest of promoting aviation safety. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Recorded voice data, such as from cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) or air traffic 
control tapes, can be an important source of evidence for accident investigation, as 
well as for human factors research. During accident investigations, the extent of 
analysis of these recordings depends on the nature and severity of the accident. 
However, most of the analysis has been based on subjective interpretation rather 
than the use of systematic methods, particularly when dealing with the analysis of 
crew interactions.  
This paper presents a methodology, called conversation analysis, which involves the 
detailed examination of interaction as it develops moment-to-moment between the 
participants, in context. Conversation analysis uses highly detailed and revealing 
transcriptions of recorded voice (or video) data that can allow deeper analyses of 
how people interact.  
The paper uses conversation analysis as a technique to examine CVR data from an 
accident flight. The focus accident was a controlled flight into terrain event 
involving an Israel Aircraft Industries Westwind 1124 jet aircraft, which impacted 
terrain near Alice Springs on 27 April 1995.  
The conversation analysis methodology provided a structured means for analysing 
the crew’s interaction. The error that contributed directly to the accident, an 
incorrectly set minimum descent altitude, can be seen as not the responsibility of 
one pilot, but at least in part as the outcome of the way the two pilots communicated 
with one another. The analysis considered the following aspects in particular: the 
significance of overlapping talk (when both pilots spoke at the same time); the 
copilot’s silence after talk from the pilot in command; instances when the pilot in 
command corrected (repaired) the copilot’s talk or conduct; and lastly, a range of 
aspects for how the two pilots communicated to perform routine tasks. In summary, 
the conversation analysis methodology showed how specific processes of 
interaction between crew members helped to create a working environment 
conducive to making, and not detecting, an error. By not interacting to work 
together as a team, pilots can create a context for error. 
When analysing recorded voice data, and especially for understanding instances of 
human error, often a great deal rests on investigators’ or analysts’ interpretations of 
what a pilot said, or what was meant by what was said, or how talk was understood, 
or how the mood in the cockpit or the pilots’ working relationship could best be 
described. Conversation analysis can be a tool for making such interpretations.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
It is now widely accepted that human error is a contributing factor in most aircraft 
accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). For many of these accidents that involved 
larger aircraft and crews with two or more pilots, some of the errors related to 
problems in communication or task coordination between the pilots (Salas et al, 
2001). Consequently, there has been a considerable amount of research that has 
examined the nature of crew communication and coordination (Helmreich, Merritt 
& Wilhelm, 1999; Wiener, Kanki & Helmreich 1993). There has also been 
considerable amount of effort expended in training airline pilots in crew resource 
management techniques (Salas et al., 2001), and a considerable amount of effort 
expended in developing and applying techniques to evaluate crew performance in 
these areas, using behavioural markers and techniques such as the Line Operations 
Safety Audit (Flin et al., 2003; Helmreich, Klinect & Wilhelm, 1999).  
It is also widely accepted that, even though human errors may have been a factor in 
a particular accident, investigations should focus on identifying the reasons for such 
errors rather than the errors themselves (Maurino et al., 1995; Reason, 1990, 1997). 
These reasons may include a range of factors associated with the task and 
environmental conditions, as well as the broader organisational context in which the 
crews operated. However, to identify these underlying reasons, the nature of the 
crew actions needs to be examined in detail. In addition, the context in which the 
actions occurred also needs to be considered (Dekker, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Reason, 
1997).  
This paper presents a technique that can be used to analyse recorded voice 
communications in context, and shows how this technique can be used to 
demonstrate how and why communications between two or more pilots were not 
effective. The technique, called conversation analysis, involves the detailed 
examination of interaction as it develops between the participants. We use this 
technique to examine the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) from an accident flight. We 
show how specific processes of interaction between crew members can help to 
create a working environment conducive to the pilots making, and not detecting, an 
error. By not interacting to work together as a team, pilots can create a context for 
error. 
The research paper is the outcome of collaboration between an academic researcher 
with a background in applied linguistics and micro-sociology who has conducted a 
major study of routine communication in the airline cockpit (see especially Nevile 
2004a), and a senior transport safety investigator with an academic background in 
organisational and cognitive psychology and with substantial experience 
investigating human factors for aircraft accidents. 
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2 CURRENT METHODS FOR ANALYSING 
RECORDED VOICE COMMUNICATIONS 
Recorded voice data, such as from CVRs or air traffic control tapes, can be an 
important source of evidence for accident investigation, as well as for human factors 
research. During accident investigations, the extent of analysis of these recordings 
depends on the nature and severity of the accident. However, most of the analysis 
has been based on subjective interpretation rather than the use of systematic 
methods, particularly when dealing with the analysis of crew interactions. When 
transcriptions are conducted, they typically list only the speaker, the time at which 
the utterance started, and the words spoken. Detailed information about how the 
words are spoken is usually excluded. This is probably because investigators have 
limited tools to analyse this data in a structured manner. However, it may also be 
due in part to sensitivities associated with releasing CVR information. 
Two main types of techniques have been used for more structured analysis of 
recorded voice communications. The first type, commonly termed ‘speech analysis’ 
(or ‘voice analysis’) looks at a pattern of voice information and related behaviour to 
identify possible factors affecting an individual’s performance. This will generally 
involve measurement of variables such as fundamental frequency (pitch), speech 
rate (number of syllables per second), intensity (or loudness), speech errors, 
response time, and aspects of the speech quality. The data is then compared with 
carefully selected samples, generally from the same person under normal 
conditions. Speech analysis has been successfully employed to examine the 
influence of factors such as stress and workload (Brenner, Doherty & Shipp, 1994; 
Ruiz, Legros & Guell, 1990), alcohol (Brenner & Cash, 1991) and hypoxia 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2001). However, it focuses on the factors 
affecting a specific individual, rather than the pattern of communications between 
individuals.  
The second type of technique has involved the coding of speech acts (Helmreich, 
1994; Predmore, 1991; Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 2003). This process 
typically involves coding each utterance in terms of its function or ‘thought unit’ 
(e.g., command, advocacy, observation, inquiry). It also involves coding ‘action 
decision sequences’ of utterances in terms of their task focus (e.g., flight control, 
damage assessment, problem solving, emergency preparation). This coded data is 
then examined in terms of how it is distributed between the crew, and how it 
changes over time during the flight. Where possible, comparisons are made with 
available data from other crews.  
Although speech act coding can offer useful insights into communication dynamics, 
its effectiveness can be limited by a lack of available data on how other crews from 
similar backgrounds communicated in similar situations. Also, it does not use all the 
available information about how things are said or communicated, and this 
information can be important in establishing the context for the crew 
communications. A technique that focuses on this additional information is 
conversation analysis.  
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3 CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 
Conversation analysis is a micro-analytical approach to the study of naturally 
occurring interaction. As a discipline, its origins are in sociology and are usually 
traced to a paper on the organisation of turn-taking in conversation, written in the 
mid 1970s by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974). The early development of 
conversation analysis is especially associated with the ideas of Harvey Sacks (see 
Sacks, 1992, Silverman, 1998), and the influence of ethnomethodology (e.g. 
Garfinkel, 1967). Conversation analysis shows in micro-detail how naturally 
occurring interaction is sequentially ordered and collaboratively produced and 
understood by participants, moment-to-moment, in what has been described as the 
“intrinsic orderliness of interactional phenomena” (Psathas, 1995, p.8). 
Conversation analysis looks at how interaction is something people jointly 
accomplish ‘locally’ (i.e., there and then). Recent introductions to conversation 
analysis are provided by Hutchby & Wooffitt (1998) and ten Have (1999). 
Increasingly, conversation analysis is now being drawn upon in studies of 
interaction for work in institutional and professional settings, such as in medicine 
and counselling, education, law and policing, business, human-computer 
interaction, and control centres (e.g., Drew & Heritage, 1992; Button, 1993; Heath 
& Luff, 2000; McHoul & Rapley, 2001; Richards & Seedhouse, 2004). Most 
relevantly, one of the present authors has used conversation analysis for a major 
video-based study of routine communication, or ‘talk-in-interaction’, in the airline 
cockpit (Nevile 2001, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2005b, in press). In the present paper, 
four features of conversation analysis will be central to our presentation and 
analyses of recorded voice data. 
1. Conversation analysis is concerned with naturally occurring data, not data 
specifically generated for research purposes. It uses recordings, and the 
transcriptions made of them, of naturally occurring interactions. Analysts may 
make use of observation, interviews, or other ethnographic techniques, but 
their emphasis is on how the participants develop and demonstrate their actions 
and understandings in real time. 
2. Conversation analysis uses highly detailed and revealing transcriptions of 
recorded voice (or video) data that can allow deeper analyses of how people 
interact. The process of transcribing is an important part of the discovery 
process, and involves repeatedly listening to the recording. Transcribing is 
undertaken with an open mind about what might be there, a process called 
unmotivated looking. 
3. Conversation analysis is data driven and relies for its claims on the evidence 
available in the data itself, on what the participants themselves say and do, and 
just how and when they do so as the interaction develops. Claims about 
participants’ understandings and actions must be based on, and demonstrated 
in, analyses of the transcription data. Conversation analysis looks at what 
happens, and then what happens next, and asks ‘Why that now?’ Analysts 
avoid preconceptions of participants or settings, and ascribing to participants’ 
mental, motivational or emotional states, but seek evidence for these in the 
details of how interaction develops.   
4. Conversation analysis examines what people say and do in context, seeing how 
these actions occur in sequence relative to one another, rather than isolating 
actions from their contexts of occurrence. Conversation analysis shows how 
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actions are both shaped by context and also shape context by influencing 
participants’ subsequent actions and understandings of what is happening. 
 
Using conversation analysis meets recent calls to analyse human error in context 
(e.g., Dekker, 2001a, 2001b), to “reconstruct the unfolding mindset” of the people 
involved “in parallel and tight connection with how the world was evolving around 
these people at the time” (Dekker, 2001a, p.39). With conversation analysis, the 
analyst can use highly detailed transcriptions of spoken data (or even visual data) as 
the evidence for how the pilots themselves create particular patterns of 
communication, and interpret and understand what they are doing and what is going 
on, in context. The technique therefore offers a means for describing, in terms that 
are defensible because they are grounded in the voice data, how members of a flight 
crew are working together.  
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4 THE FOCUS ACCIDENT 
We will focus on data from one accident, and use this accident as an example of 
what can be done, and what can be found, using methods and principles of 
conversation analysis. This paper is not an attempt to outline and understand all the 
complex factors that contributed to the accident. Instead, we only focus on the way 
in which the pilots interacted with one another. 
The accident was a controlled flight into terrain event involving an Israel Aircraft 
Industries Westwind 1124 jet aircraft on a night cargo flight (Bureau of Air Safety 
Investigation, 1996).
1
 The two-pilot crew was conducting a practice non-precision 
approach in clear moonless conditions. The approach involved a stepped descent in 
three stages using three navigation aids. The flight proceeded normally until the 
aircraft passed over the final approach fix, at which point the pilot in command 
(PIC) asked the copilot (CP) to set the ‘minima’ in the altitude alert selector. The 
copilot responded by calling and setting 2,300 feet, and this action was 
acknowledged by the pilot in command. However, the relevant minimum height that 
applied to the accident aircraft at that stage in the approach was 3,100 ft. Shortly 
after levelling off at 2,250 feet, the aircraft struck the top of a mountain range and 
was destroyed. 
The pilot in command was a former airline pilot with 10,108 hours total flight 
experience, and 2,591 hours on the Westwind aircraft. The copilot had 3,747 hours 
total flight experience, most of which was conducted in helicopters. He had 80 
hours of experience on the Westwind. The pilot in command was the handling pilot 
for the flight. 
The accident investigation identified a number of factors that contributed to this 
accident, including that the technique employed by the pilot in command in flying 
the approach involved a high cockpit workload. A number of the contributing 
factors involved problems in the communication between the crew. The report 
concluded that there were difficulties in the cockpit relationship between the pilot in 
command and the copilot, and that the level of crew resource management 
demonstrated by both pilots during the flight was low. Most of the evidence for 
these conclusions came from the 30 minutes of recorded voice communications on 
the aircraft’s CVR. Although the investigation team considered that there was 
ample evidence to support the conclusions, it experienced difficulty in clearly 
substantiating the conclusions in a precise manner. Based on this experience, the 
Bureau subsequently explored a variety of techniques that could assist the analysis 
of recorded voice communications. One of these techniques was conversation 
analysis. 
A transcript of the CVR for the accident flight was included in the BASI report on 
the accident. The present paper contains no substantially new information on what 
was said, but contains new information in terms of how things were said. This 
additional information has been released by the ATSB for the purposes of 
enhancing aviation safety. 
 
                                                     
1
 The Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) became part of the newly 
formed the multi-modal Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) on 1 July 1999. 
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5 THE VALUE OF DETAILED TRANSCRIPTION 
Prior to reviewing segments of conversation from the focus accident, we need to 
outline the nature of conversation analysis transcription. Conversation analysis has 
developed particular notation for representing systematically many details of talk 
(or nontalk activities) that studies have shown to be significant to participants 
themselves (i.e., for how participants interpret what is going on, as evidenced in 
what they do next). One advantage of transcribing recorded data by using notation 
developed in conversation analysis is that the transcriptions can show much more 
about what is actually happening, and why. In short, conversation analysis shows 
how transcribing voice data involves much more than recording what people say - it 
involves showing just how they say it. Typically, conversation analysis 
transcriptions of audio data can indicate at least the following: 
• how talk is sequentially ordered as turns, or how and when participants 
exchange roles as speaker and listener (recipient); 
• exact measures of silence in and between utterances (timed to the tenth of a 
second); 
• periods when two or more people are talking at once (overlapping talk), and 
the exact points in talk when such periods begin and end; 
• features of the manner of talk, such as lengthening of sounds, pitch contours 
and marked rises and falls in pitch, talk that is faster or slower, or louder or 
quieter than surrounding talk, talk that is incomplete (e.g., cut-off), and 
aspects of voice quality (e.g., breathiness, creaky voice); 
• ‘tokens’ such as ‘oh’, ‘um’ and  ‘ah’; and 
• laughter (in individual pulses), and exactly when laughter begins and ends.  
To highlight some of the features of conversation analysis transcription, we show 
for comparison two transcriptions of the same segment of talk from the focus CVR. 
The first is a basic transcription, in the form it appeared in the investigation report 
(Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, 1996). It shows mainly who is speaking to 
whom, the words spoken, and the time of speaking. PIC is pilot in command, CP is 
copilot. 
 
Example 5.1: A basic transcription 
 
TIME FROM TO TEXT  
 
1934.05   PIC   CP we’ll go down to forty-three hundred to there and 
    if you can wind in thirty-four fifty and when we 
    when we get over there wind in twenty-seven 
    eighty that’ll be the minimum we’ll see how it 
    looks for a giggle and you can put the steps in 
   now too if you wouldn’t mind but you only need 
   to put the steps in below the lowest safe 
   (non-pertinent transmissions) 
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Now we present the same segment of talk but transcribed using notation developed 
in conversation analysis. The conversation analysis notation is given in the 
Appendix. 
 
Example 5.2: A conversation analysis transcription 
 
 (18.0) 
PIC we’ll go down to fortythree hundred to there, (0.5) and if you c’n wind  
 in thirtyfour fifty, 
 (0.6) 
PIC and when we- (0.9) when we get over there wind in twentyseven eighty. 
 (0.3) 
PIC °that’ll be the minimum°. 
 (1.8)  
PIC see how it looks. 
 (2.5) 
PIC just for a ↑giggle, 
 (6.4) 
PIC ah::: you c’n put the steps in there too if you wouldn’t mind. 
 (1.5) 
PIC >but you only need< to put the steps in <below the lowest safe>. 
MELB Gulf Air one (triple/two four) eight, (0.2) contact me on one two eight 
 decimal one (     ). 
 (1.4) 
  
To highlight the key differences, we can see that the conversation analysis 
transcription does the following: 
• represents the pilot in command’s talk as a number of separate turns, rather 
than as one long turn - the breaks in talk, shown on separate lines as periods 
of silence between turns, represent points where the copilot could have 
heard the pilot in command’s talk as complete in some way, and so the 
copilot could have taken a turn to talk (e.g., even if just to say ‘yeah’ or 
‘okay’); 
• shows and times all silences, and their lengths in seconds, both within and 
between the pilot in command’s turns e.g., (1.8); 
• shows details of the manner of talk, including marked rises in pitch (↑), and 
intonation that is falling (.) or slightly rising (,) (i.e., hearably incomplete), 
also talk which relative to surrounding talk is louder (“wind”), or quieter 
(“°minimum°”), or faster (“>but you only need<”), or slower (“<below the 
lowest safe>”), and shows talk that is lengthened (“ah:::”), or cut-off (“we-
“), or repeated (“when we- (0.9) when we”); 
• includes overheard radio talk i.e. an ATC transmission directed to another 
flight, as part of the communicative environment in which the pilots are 
working; and 
• includes the token “ah”. 
 
 7
6 EVIDENCE OF A CONTEXT FOR ERROR: 
SEGMENTS OF CVR DATA 
Our suggestion in this paper is that the final crew errors that contributed to the 
accident emerged from an immediate work environment that was conducive to 
errors occurring and not being identified. The ways in which the pilots 
communicated with one another created a context for error. We will discuss, with 
some segments of representative CVR data, the following features of interaction. 
1. There were many instances of overlapping talk (i.e. both pilots speaking at the 
same time).  
2. There were many instances when the pilot in command said something and the 
copilot said nothing in reply (i.e. the copilot is silent), even though some form 
of a response would have been a relevant and projectable (expected) next 
action.  
3. The pilot in command often corrected (or repaired) the copilot’s talk or 
conduct when there was no sign of any problem, from the copilot’s point of 
view, in the copilot’s talk or conduct itself.  
4. Many aspects of how the two pilots communicated to perform routine tasks 
suggest that the pilots were not working together in harmony as a crew.  
Individually, each of these features may mean little, but together they can have a 
cumulative effect. It is not our intention and it is not necessary to conduct a 
quantitative analysis of particular features of the talk data. This is usually difficult 
or impossible with the limited data available in recorded voice data. However, these 
features were identified because they were noticeably recurrent in the CVR data, 
and can be taken as evidence of the patterns of interaction developed by these two 
crew members over a period of that accident flight. We have no interest in making 
wider claims about the pilots’ talk or conduct other than in relation to the CVR data 
for this flight.  
Unless we specify a source, we will be grounding our comments on well established 
principles and findings of conversation analysis, as emerging in research over the 
past three decades and discussed in general texts such as Hutchby & Wooffitt 
(1998) and ten Have (1999). We will also refer to research on routine cockpit 
communications using conversation analysis, focussing on airline crews, conducted 
by one of the present authors (especially Nevile 2004a). The CVR data here are 
from a cargo flight, not an airline flight, but we will assume that there are in 
common shared mission goals (safe landing) and activities (flight tasks), and so 
preferred practices for clear and effective communication for flying multi-engine 
commercial aircraft. 
Note that many or most data examples exhibit more than one of the features we 
focus on in this paper. However, to avoid repetition of data in most cases we have 
placed examples under just one or other of the main headings. 
6.1 Overlapping talk 
In both ordinary conversation and talk in work and institutional settings, it is 
common for there to be points when more than one person talks at a time. Such 
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instances of ‘overlapping’ talk often occur at points where one person is heard to be 
possibly coming to the end of their turn at talk. The overlapping talk occurs as 
someone other than the speaker begins to talk, and often emerges as the next 
speaker and produces the next turn at talk. Overlapping talk at the end of turns is 
usually not treated by participants as interruption, but as part of the normal flow of 
talk to exchange turns and switch speaker/listener roles.  
However, Nevile (2004a, 2005a) has found it to be unusual for flight crews to 
overlap their talk. That is, pilots usually do not begin talking when another pilot is 
still talking. This was seen to be the case even when pilots were talking and 
exchanging turns very quickly, for example during the performance of a checklist. 
Pilots seem oriented to allow one another’s talk to emerge in the clear. Overlapping 
talk does occasionally occur, but relatively rarely in task-oriented talk, perhaps only 
two to three times per flight.  
In the CVR data for the accident flight, there were more than twenty instances of 
overlapping talk. On its own this is a noticeable feature of the accident flight. The 
great majority of these instances of overlapping talk occurred when the pilot in 
command began to talk when the copilot was already talking. That is, the pilot in 
command was the participant responsible for initiating the overlapping talk. Many 
of these instances were at points in the copilot’s talk where the pilot in command 
could expect that the copilot’s turn was coming to a close. That is, the pilot in 
command was predicting or projecting the end of the copilot’s turn and beginning 
his own turn at talk in response (see examples 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). As we have said, 
this kind of overlap is common in everyday conversation, but is uncommon in 
cockpit communication. Overlapped talk is shown by [square brackets]. 
Example 6.1.1 
 
(10.1) 
PIC now the minute we go over Spring Hi:ll, (0.6) or whatever it’s called 
Simp- err=  
CP =Simpsons [ga:p 
PIC        [Simpson is it? 
       (0.2) 
PIC yea:h. 
 (1.4) 
 
 
Example 6.1.2 
  
 (2.2) 
CP gear’s down (.) three greens co[nfirm? 
PIC               [c:o:::nfi::rm. 
 (4.3) 
CP okay hydraulic pressure’s checked in two:::, anti[skid, 
                   [((tone, 1 second)) 
PIC one to run. 
 (0.4) 
 
More significantly however, there were also numerous instances in the data where 
the pilot in command began to talk even though the copilot had not finished his turn 
at talk, where there was potentially still talk of substance to be uttered and heard 
(see examples 6.1.3-5). In lay terms, the pilot in command could be heard as 
interrupting the copilot. This occurred even at times when the copilot was 
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presenting important information for the pilots’ joint conduct and understanding of 
the progress of the flight. 
Example 6.1.3 
 
 (1.1) 
CP >Alice on< number one, 
 (1.0) 
PIC ye::p. 
 (0.4) 
PIC Alice on number one, 
 (0.5) 
CP? (yep). 
 (2.6) 
CP Simpson’s gap? (.) o:n [(0.2) number two,] 
PIC               [Simpson’s   gap’s] on number two::, 
 (0.7) 
 
Example 6.1.4 
 
 (0.4) 
CP thrust rever[sers check(ed).] 
PIC        [(it’s on) light’s] out. 
 (1.0) 
 
Example 6.1.5 
 
 (1.5) 
CP below the: (.) lowest safe so, (0.5) twentynine (here) [(on the) (          )] 
PIC                                      [(twentynine)] 
  five and eight (two) 
 (     ) 
 (3.5) 
 
These instances of overlapping talk suggest, at the very least, that these two pilots 
are not coordinating the timing of their communicative contributions in the smooth 
manner found to be typical of commercial flight crews. However, where one pilot 
initiated such points of overlapping talk far more than the other pilot, that pilot 
could be heard to be dominating the other pilot’s communication, and so also their 
contributions to the work of operating the aircraft. Overlapping talk is also possibly 
a problem because it can increase the chances of something being misheard, or not 
heard at all. The pilots may be speaking simultaneously, but they may not both be 
listening. 
6.2 Silence 
A great deal of research in conversation analysis has shown how people speak in 
sequences of turns at talk, and orient to (or are sensitive to) the sequential nature of 
conversational exchange. This means that, overwhelmingly, when one person in an 
interaction produces a turn at talk (the first of a pair of utterances – or ‘first pair 
part’), the other person produces talk that is appropriate as a response to that first 
turn (‘second pair part’). More than this, particular types of turns at talk are 
associated with particular types of response, and indeed can be thought of as 
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expecting (or ‘preferring’) particular types of response (e.g. question and answer, 
telling and acknowledgement).  
Conversation analysis studies have consistently found that silences between the 
turns of a sequence, from as little as 0.3 or 0.4 of a second, are noticeable to 
participants and are interpreted by participants as meaning certain things, and can 
prompt action of some kind. For example, the silence possibly signals a problem 
with the first turn, such as it was not heard, or was not understood, or was 
unexpected, or will be disagreed with or declined. The lengths and meanings of 
silences in work settings can vary significantly from ordinary conversation, but in 
work settings people also talk in sequences, and the cockpit is no exception (Nevile 
2004a, 2005b). When one pilot talks the other usually responds, and in a way that 
can be heard as appropriate. 
In the CVR data from the accident flight, there were many instances where the pilot 
in command said something, the first pair part of a sequence (e.g., a 
telling/informing, an instruction, or a question), but the copilot did not produce any 
appropriate and expectable spoken response (e.g., an acceptance/acknowledgment, 
or compliance, or an answer). An excellent example of this was presented above as 
example 5.2, but see also examples 6.2.1-3.  
 
Example 6.2.1 
 
 (1.2) 
PIC  so you can put the inbound course up there::. 
 (22.8) 
PIC thank you::. 
 (5.5) 
 
 
Example 6.2.2 
  
 (9.8) 
PIC  okay you can take the rnav out tha:nks::: 
PIC just put Alice up, 
 (high pitch tone, 1 second)) 
 (18.8) 
 
Example 6.2.3 
 
 (8.4) 
PIC okay we’re assuming we’ve got the ah::: (0.9) the ident on a- (.) all the  
 time okay? (.) if you just  identify ‘em and then (1.9) turn them off, 
 (21.1) 
 
Some examples of the copilot’s silence occurred after the pilot in command 
corrected the copilot’s performance of some action, or failure to do something (see 
example 6.2.4). Also, a pattern of pilot in command talking with no spoken 
response from the copilot was seen to occur even when the pilot in command 
appeared explicitly to pursue a response from the copilot, as in example 6.2.5 (and 
see especially “‘n fact it’s a fair way out isn’t it?”). This example occurred after a 
problematic exchange of turns where the pilot in command corrected an error by the 
copilot and the copilot attempted to defend his conduct. In short, the copilot 
appeared to choose to be silent, and finally only spoke when he must, to complete a 
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prescribed sequence of reciprocal turns for setting the speed bugs (“set on the 
right.”). 
 
Example 6.2.4 
 
 (8.6) 
PIC  okay if you can put the rnav (0.3) up thanks::. 
 (1.4) 
PIC whoo::::h. 
 (0.6) 
PIC  do that fir:::st. 
  (1.6) 
PIC  bring em both out, 
 (0.4) 
PIC o:kay. 
 (4.3) 
 ((alert sound - beep)) 
 (0.8) 
PIC righto. 
 (46.6) 
PIC ah::: have you got the ILS preed up there just in ca:se::? 
 (34.8) 
PIC thanks. 
 (35.3) 
 
 
Example 6.2.5 
 
 (0.5)  
PIC yeah I dunno how we’re gonna get rid of tha::t. 
 (1.5) 
PIC I guess: all you can do if it doesn’ go away::, (1.0) is:: ah:: (1.0) put my 
 information on your si:::de. 
 (2.7)  
PIC it’s no good the way it i:s:. 
 (5.8) 
PIC ‘n fact it’s a fair way out isn’t it? 
 (33.8) 
PIC >there you go.< 
 (1.9) 
PIC ’s got rid of it for a whi::le anyway. 
 (1.6) 
PIC  okay we’re gonna do this: (.) for a bit of a giggle, 
 (1.3)  
PIC u:::m (.) elevation’s eighteen hundred feet, (1.5) we got enough fuel to 
 ho:ld for one point four hours if need be, (1.5) a::nd ah:: we gotta vee 
 ref of one twenty set on the left,  
 (0.2) 
CP set on the right. 
 (4.8) 
 
 
In some of these cases it is possible that the copilot could indeed have been 
responding, but with a nontalk activity (e.g., a nod, or an activity at an instrument 
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panel). The cockpit is a workplace where the response to talk is often nontalk 
activity, however such activity is also almost always accompanied by talk (Nevile 
2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2005b). A possible exception to this is during a formal briefing 
when pilots can speak in longer (extended) turns, but even in briefings there is 
usually evidence of the pilots acknowledging one another’s contributions and 
orienting to a need to communicate verbally as they work together (Nevile 2004b). 
Other than during briefings, it is extremely unusual to have a string of turns at talk 
where one pilot talks and the other pilot says nothing at all in reply. 
Conversation analysis discusses silence in terms of ‘conditional relevance’. The 
copilot’s silence can be seen as an absence of speech in a context where the pilot in 
command’s talk made it relevant for the copilot to say something. The copilot was 
entitled to say something, indeed could be expected to say something. In 
conversation analysis terms, speech from the copilot would have been a 
‘projectable’ next action. In these instances silence is not simply a case of no-one 
speaking, but a case of the copilot not speaking. In terms of verbal communicative 
exchange between fellow pilots, for whatever reason one party, the copilot, 
regularly withheld talk and opted out. 
6.3 Correction (repair) 
 
Conversation analysts have identified a general conversational practice, repair, 
which may be of particular relevance to understanding error in aviation and how it 
is managed. Repair refers to those points in spoken interaction where participants 
deal with communicative problems of some sort. Conversation analysts have found 
that in everyday conversation people do not normally correct each other. There is a 
marked tendency for self-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977); that is, for 
the person who produced the ‘problem talk/conduct’ (the repairable) to repair that 
talk or conduct, and to be granted the opportunity to do so by the other person. 
Conversation analysts have shown that participants distinguish between the 
initiation of the repair (i.e., showing that there is a problem) and actually doing the 
repair (i.e., fixing the problem). So, even where the other might initiate the repair, 
there is still the tendency for self-repair. This ‘preference’ for ‘self-repair’ is seen in 
data for flight crews (Nevile 2004a). Conversation analysts have shown that, when 
another person both initiates and performs a repair (called other-initiated other-
repair), that repair is typically delayed, hedged or qualified in some way. The 
person doing the repair softens the blow.  
In the CVR data for the accident flight, there were many instances of other-initiated 
other-repair. The pilot who produced the problem talk or conduct did not initiate 
repair and did not repair that talk or conduct. Overwhelmingly, the pattern of these 
instances involved the pilot in command both initiating and performing the 
correction/repair of the copilot’s talk or conduct (see examples 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 
below, and 6.2.4 earlier). The pilot in command repaired the copilot’s talk/conduct 
when there was no sign of any trouble, in the copilot’s talk/conduct itself, from the 
copilot’s point of view. The first the copilot knew that there was something to be 
corrected in his talk or conduct was when the pilot in command corrected it. More 
than this, the pilot in command did not delay, hedge, or qualify his repairs of the 
copilot. The pilot in command gave the copilot no or little opportunity to correct the 
problem for himself.  
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Example 6.3.1 
 
 (0.4)  
CP and it’s a seven mile f-f- 
 (0.5) 
? (     )= 
CP =seven mile final.= 
PIC =no:: el↑even. 
CP eleven. 
 (6.9) 
 
Example 6.3.2 
 
 (6.2) 
CP the only trouble we might get is, (0.5) if they lea::ve. 
 (1.3) 
CP if they leave before us (0.3) they might depart out on, (0.4) one two. 
 (0.7) 
PIC well they ca::n’t, (0.2) we got their freight. 
 (1.6) 
CP °(that’s right)° 
 (9.3) 
 
Example 6.3.1 is a clear example of other-initiated other-repair and warrants 
further explanation. Here the copilot, as part of his preparation for the approach, 
informed the pilot in command that it will be a “=seven mile final.=”. The copilot 
had two goes at saying this, abruptly stopping his first attempt with “seven mile f-f-
“. The pilot in command corrected the copilot’s ‘seven’ by saying “=no:: el↑even.”. 
The ‘=’ symbols indicate that the pilot in command’s turn is ‘latched’ to the end of 
the copilot’s turn (i.e., the pilot in command produced his talk with no delay 
whatsoever after the end of the copilot’s turn). Recalling that in interaction there is a 
tendency (or ‘preference’ in conversation analysis terms) for self-repair, the copilot 
was given no opportunity, after completing his problem turn, himself to repair the 
incorrect number. That is, the pilot in command did not say something like 
‘Seven?’, or ‘Are you sure it’s seven?’, or ‘Is that right?’, or even just wait a second 
or so to give the copilot a chance to rethink and possibly identify and say the correct 
number himself. Note that the copilot actually said the problem number, ‘seven’, 
twice, the first time in the turn that he cut off. Therefore it is possible that the pilot 
in command heard the problem ‘seven’ twice and let it go the first time, giving the 
copilot the chance to get it right. However, that first talk by the copilot was not 
completed (“seven mile f-f-”), and it is when he completed his turn and presented 
the number he had actually settled on (“=seven mile final.=”) that the pilot in 
command immediately corrected him.  
Not only did the pilot in command do the repair himself immediately, with no 
delay, no hedging, and no qualification, the repair began with an explicit marker of 
negation. This had its prominence increased because it was said with increased 
volume and was also lengthened (“no::”). The pilot in command continued his turn 
by simply saying the repaired number ‘eleven’, and in the following turn the copilot 
accepted this repair without question, indeed without delay. The pilot in command’s 
saying of ‘eleven’ was a claim that this number was the correct one, and this claim 
was immediately accepted by the copilot. So, a possible problem of crew 
understanding about the length of the final leg was resolved by one individual 
telling another, effectively, that he was wrong, and the other individual accepting 
this without question.  
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6.4 Performing tasks 
Finally, we consider how the two pilots generally performed routine flight tasks for 
this period of the flight. Our general finding is that it was typically the pilot in 
command who talked to initiate tasks, and he did so in ways that can make 
prominent his authoritative status as pilot in command for the flight, and the other 
pilot’s junior status. That is, the pilot in command’s wording can be heard to present 
tasks as being performed for him, as the pilot in command, by the copilot, rather 
than as being performed collaboratively for both pilots as a crew, and by both pilots 
as a crew, albeit that it is often appropriately the case that the copilot is doing the 
required task activity. Such wording could be heard as creating a sense that the 
copilot was serving the pilot in command, rather than that the two pilots were 
working together as team members with different but equally necessary and 
valuable contributions to flight tasks. The nature of the copilot’s participation in 
task performance could deepen this sense of how the pilots were working. 
To demonstrate these points we describe a number of specific aspects of the pilots’ 
communication and interaction as they performed routine tasks. We stress, however, 
that many segments actually exhibit more than one of the aspects described below. 
The collection of segments makes it easier to understand how, over time, the effect 
of particular aspects of communication can accumulate and create a context in 
which the pilots seem not to be working together but instead more according to their 
individual statuses and roles. We do not have scope here to discuss any segments in 
detail.  
Firstly, the pilot in command typically initiated tasks with commands to the copilot. 
In grammatical terms he used imperative structures that communicate ‘Do X’ (see 
examples 6.4.1-3). 
 
Example 6.4.1 
 
 (10.1) 
PIC now the minute we go over Spring Hi:ll, (0.6) or whatever it’s called 
 Simp- err=  
CP =Simpsons [ga:p 
PIC        [Simpson is it? 
  (0.2) 
PIC yea:h. 
 (1.4) 
PIC ah:::m (.) set the next altitude ↑u:p, (0.5) and the nex:t:, (0.5) NDB. 
 (2.5) 
 
Example 6.4.2 
 
  (4.7) 
PIC keep going. 
 (4.8) 
PIC keep going. (.) checks th[anks. 
CP                 [okay vee ref (0.2) one three set. (.) fuel balance, 
PIC it’s within limits:::. 
 (1.4) 
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Example 6.4.3 
 
 (1.4) 
HT? hotel tango (    ) good night (and thanks). 
PIC  he said to call Adelaide no:w didn’t he? 
CP yeh. 
 (0.3) 
PIC  well you can go off, (0.5) go (on/off) tha:t. 
 (4.5) 
? (s-    ) (respond). 
 (9.5) 
 
The pilot in command also very frequently used the first person singular personal 
pronoun ‘I’, which presented him as central to the task and as the recipient for 
performance of the task, and the second person pronoun ‘you’, which presented the 
copilot as the one doing the task. That is, the pilot in command’s usual wording can 
convey the sense that ‘you are doing the task for me’. Such use of ‘I’ and ‘you’ by a 
pilot in command and handling pilot is not in itself exceptional as a means for 
making salient relevant individual cockpit identities (Nevile 2001, 2004a). However 
their use almost to the exclusion of more inclusive plural forms (e.g., we/our/us) can 
mark this CVR data as unusual for cockpit talk. Coupled with his use of ‘I’ and 
‘you’ pronoun forms, the pilot in command regularly used verbs such as ‘want’ and 
‘have’ (e.g., ‘I want X’, ‘Can I have X’), making further salient his individual roles 
on this flight as the pilot in command and handling pilot, and the other pilot’s 
individual role as copilot doing actions for him (see examples 6.4.4 and 6.4.5). 
Also, the pilot in command’s wording often included some form of instruction, 
tutoring or unsolicited advice to the copilot on how, when, or why some activity 
should or should not be done. These were done in ways that can be heard as 
directive. The pilot in command’s wording also rarely included a politeness or 
mitigation marker when initiating a task and calling on the copilot to do some 
activity.
2
  
 
                                                     
2
 Sometimes the pilot in command said ‘thank you’ or ‘thanks’ (e.g., examples 6.4.6 and 
6.4.7), but it should not be assumed that these conveyed appreciation. Our comments here 
are less securely based on existing conversation analysis research, and therefore more 
tentative, but the interactional impact and meaning of ‘thanking’ depends greatly on the 
prosody (i.e., how the ‘thanking’ is said). Certain prosodic patterns can convey appreciation, 
others mere acknowledgement, and others might even imply sarcasm, complaint or some 
other action. Appreciation is usually expressed with rise-fall or falling intonation, with the 
stress and pitch rise early in ‘thanks’ or on ‘thank’ in ‘thank you’, and falling pitch and stress 
for the end of ‘thanks’ or on ‘you’ in ‘thank you’. The CVR transcription data of the accident 
flight showed many departures from this usual pattern, and we hear them as making salient 
the copilot’s role in doing tasks for the pilot in command, tasks that are required of him as 
the copilot. We hear in the thanking a sense that the copilot was understood to be performing 
an obligatory duty. The ‘thanking’, especially when occurring last in the sequence of turns at 
talk for a task, acted as an acknowledgement that this duty had been done.  
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Example 6.4.4 
 
 (9.3) 
PIC okay. 
 (1.3) 
PIC on number one, (0.5) I want ah::: (1.3) Alice NDB? 
 (3.2) 
CP °(alright)° 
 (2.9) 
PIC number two I want that one, 
 (3.5) 
PIC so we want tha::t, (0.9) and tha::t, (2.5) and that one [(     ) 
                         [((static sound))  
EAO Melbourne control good evening echo alpha oscar posit[ion quebec  
PIC                         [that to  
EAO [two three bravo one zero zero two, (0.5) maintaining flight level three  
PIC [number one, (0.5) that to number two, (0.4) and that is (0.2) pree::d 
EAO [      f i::ve                zero] 
PIC [up, (0.7) on number two.] 
 (0.5) 
EAO (correct) two three charlie [  (0.2)  ] one zero two seven. 
CP         [okay::.] 
 (1.3) 
 
 
Example 6.4.5 
 
 (0.7)  
PIC can I have? (0.7) an rnav (0.3) fo:::r, (0.2) <an eleven mi:le (.) fi:nal?,> 
 (1.1) 
PIC runway one: (.) two:. 
 (1.8) 
CP yep, 
 (5.8) 
PIC I only want it (.) preed up. 
 (0.6) 
CP okay. 
 (3.2) 
 
 
The pilot in command often included an assessment such as ‘that’ll do’ or ‘that’s 
fine’, presenting himself as an assessor of the copilot’s talk/conduct for a task (see 
example 6.4.6, and perhaps 6.2.4 earlier). 
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Example 6.4.6 
 
  (0.8) 
PIC next one, (0.2) and [the altitude thanks::.] 
        [((tone, 1 second))] 
CP thirtyfour fifty I’ll put in thirtyfi::[:ve. 
PIC                  [ye::p. 
PIC that’s fine. 
  (2.5) 
CP an:::, 
 (2.3) 
 
The copilot often responded by performing the called-for activity in silence, as 
noted earlier, or made only a minimal and non-explicit verbal response such as 
‘okay’ or ‘yep’. 
 
 
Example 6.4.7 
 
 (4.4) 
PIC ‘kay thirty mi:les we’re tracking to the RNAV position to start the 
 approa:ch:. 
CP okay. 
 (1.2) 
PIC so you can put the inbound course up there::. 
 (22.8) 
PIC thank you::. 
 (5.5) 
 
 
Example 6.4.8 
 
 (0.9) 
CP  complete to pre-landing= 
PIC =okay we’re cleared down, we know the traffic so you can <set our 
 steps up tha:nks::.> 
CP okay::. 
 (2.9) 
 
 
Example 6.4.9 
 
 (1.6) 
PIC now the minute we get close to Simpsons gap s- (.) minute we get 
 he::re, (0.6) can you read, (0.5) whatta we gotta be at forty three:? 
 (0.3) 
CP yep. 
  (0.3) 
PIC okay. 
 (0.5)  
 
 
As we consider the pilots’ talk to perform tasks, we are not saying that the aspects 
exemplified in the examples above are not found in other crews, or that different 
aspects of communication are not found elsewhere in the talk of this crew. Also, 
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each aspect occurring on its own, or occurring only on occasion, could contribute to 
quite a different sense of working relationship. However, our suggestion is that 
these aspects, taken together, and occurring over a substantial period on the CVR 
for this flight, point to a tendency for tasks to be performed in a way that can 
emphasise the pilots’ different individual statuses and roles, rather than a 
harmonious collaborative team working relationship.
3
 
 
                                                     
3
 The difference in status between pilots is often referred to as the trans-cockpit authority gradient. Gradients which 
are too flat or too steep are generally considered to contribute to less effective crew coordination and 
communication (Hawkins, 1987). 
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7 CONCLUSION 
Our aim has been to describe the context for a human error, or to consider how an 
error can be understood as emerging from the immediate working environment as 
created by the pilots, in the ways in which they communicated and interacted with 
each other. We used a specific approach to naturally occurring communication and 
interaction, conversation analysis, to transcribe and analyse CVR data of one 
aviation accident, involving a commercially operated jet aircraft. We did not focus 
on the moment of error itself, but instead on the context in which it occurred, or 
what we have called an interactional context for error. We used segments from the 
CVR data, transcribed in rich detail using notation from conversation analysis, to 
suggest that aspects of the pilots’ interaction show the pilots to be acting according 
to, emphasising, their individual statuses and roles as pilot in command and copilot, 
rather than a sense of working collaboratively as a team. 
We suggest that such aspects of interaction contribute to a working relationship that 
can be conducive to an error occurring and not being identified: they can allow for a 
collaborative construction of error. The error that contributed directly to the 
accident, an incorrectly set minimum descent altitude, can be seen as not the 
responsibility of one pilot, but at least in part as the outcome of the way the two 
pilots communicated with one another. We considered the following aspects in 
particular: the significance of overlapping talk (when both pilots spoke at the same 
time); the copilot’s silence after talk from the pilot in command; instances when the 
pilot in command corrected (repaired) the copilot’s talk or conduct; and lastly, a 
range of aspects for how the two pilots communicated to perform routine tasks. It is 
significant to note that in pointing to evidence that the pilots’ communication was 
problematic for their work as a team, it was not necessary to rely on analysing 
instances of overt conflict or communication breakdown. Communicative problems 
can build up, and be evidenced, over time.  
We hope to have demonstrated the value of looking closely at recorded voice data 
as a means for interpreting human performance, and for interpreting human error in 
aviation in the light of the world evolving around the pilots at the time (Dekker 
2001a), and indeed as the pilots themselves create it. The approach we have used is 
a way to avoid what Dekker (2001a) calls “disembodying data” when analysing 
human factors accidents. It can allow systematic and data-based assertions about 
human action. How one represents data affects greatly what one is able to see in it, 
and subsequently say about it. Conversation analysis is a micro-approach to the 
transcription and analysis of naturally occurring interaction, and richly detailed 
transcriptions using notation of conversation analysis can make maximally visible 
how pilots themselves develop and understand their respective contributions to 
interaction and to the work required to operate their aircraft. This paper has shown 
what kind of analyses and findings conversation analysis transcriptions can make 
possible. 
When analysing recorded voice data, and especially for understanding instances of 
human error, often a great deal rests on investigators’ or analysts’ interpretations of 
what a pilot said, or what was meant by what was said, or how talk was understood, 
or how the mood in the cockpit or the pilots’ working relationship could best be 
described. Conversation analysis can be a tool for making such interpretations. A 
particular value of conversation analysis as a qualitative method is that it can be 
applied to even very small amounts of data, even a single exchange of turns. By 
drawing on transcription and analytic methods arising from conversation analysis it 
is possible to eschew attempts to get into people’s heads and conjecture what they 
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are thinking and feeling. Actually analysing language in use in aviation, or any 
other work setting, can involve much more than classifying and counting this or that 
type of utterance or action. It can involve seeing how language emerges in 
interaction in context, and serves to create context.  
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9 APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION NOTATION 
 
The transcription notation used here is adapted from a system originally developed by Gail 
Jefferson. Recent variations and explanations of the system can be found in Hutchby & Wooffitt 
(1998), ten Have (1999), or Lerner (2004). 
 
PIC   pilot in command 
CP  copilot 
ADL  Adelaide control 
MELB  Melbourne control 
(.)  a micro pause, less than two-tenths of a second 
(0.3), (1.4) pauses represented in seconds and tenths of seconds 
bravo one talk in italics is spoken over the radio  
>five<  talk which is noticeably faster than surrounding talk 
<five>  talk which is noticeably slower than surrounding talk 
five  talk which is noticeably louder than surrounding talk 
°five°  talk which is noticeably quieter than surrounding talk 
five,  flat or slightly rising pitch, talk which can be heard  as incomplete 
five.  terminal falling pitch contour 
five?  terminal rising pitch contour 
fi::ve  rising pitch within word 
fi::ve  falling pitch within word 
you:.  rise fall pitch 
you:.  fall rise pitch 
↑five  marked rise in pitch 
=  talk which is latched to other talk i.e. follows immediately 
[alpha]  talk produced in overlap (simultaneous) with other talk (or noise). 
  ‘[’ indicates beginning of overlap, ‘]’ indicates end of overlap 
(     )  talk which could not be transcribed 
(five)  doubt about the talk transcribed 
(now/yeah) doubt about the talk transcribed, with possible alternatives indicated  
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